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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
The Legality of Antisatellites 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At 4 a.m. on Sunday, August 4, 1985, the Soviet Union unleashed a devas-
tating surprise attack on orbiting American communications and surveillance 
satellites. The loss of these satellites left the NATO allies 'blinded' to Warsaw 
Pact troop movements and hampered NATO's attempts to respond to subse-
quent Soviet offensives across Europe due to a massive communications 
breakdown. The Soviets had won the World's first space battle. I This is how 
General Sir John Hackett described the initial hostilities of W orId War III in 
his best seller The Third World War. 2 General Hackett attributed the success of 
the Soviet offensive in space to their antisatellite development programs of the 
1970's. These programs are not part of the novel's fantasy, rather they are 
facts in what is becoming history's most expensive arms race.' 
The purpose of this Comment will be to examine antisatellite (ASAT) wea-
ponry. After setting out a definition of ASATs and outlining their develop-
ment, it will discuss the impact that ASA Ts will have on the world in time of 
war and peace. This will be followed by an in-depth analysis of international 
law as it relates to ASATs. This Comment will conclude with a presentation of 
various proposals for positive law changes relative to the limitation and control 
of ASATs. 
l. J. HACKETT, THE THIRD WORW WAR: AUGUST 1985, at 148 (1979). 
2. Id. 
3. Paul C. Warnke, former head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and now 
Special Consultant to President Carter, described the potential arms race in space as ••• much 
more expensive' than past earthbound programs." The New Military, BUSINESS WEEK, June 4, 
1979, at 136 [hereinafter cited as The New Military). 
The United States planned to quadruple its yearly space defense spending due to successful 
Soviet antisatellite (ASA T) tests. Middleton, Soviet Tests Producing Increase in U.S. Space Dqmse 
Research, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, at 8, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Middleton). See No Ti_ to 
Hunt in Space, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1977, at 26, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Hunt in Space). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Dfjinition of ASA Ts 
ASATs, also referred to as satellite interceptors and hunter-killer satellites,· 
are space objects having the potential to interfere with the purpose of other 
space objects. 5 To accomplish this objective, ASATs may make use of one of 
three lethal mechanisms. The first type utilizes kinetic energy and disables its 
target by explosive fragmentation or by a simple nonexplosive collision. 6 A 
second type employs a directed-energy system, such as a high energy laser, in 
order to incapacitate or interfere with other space objects. 7 A third type uses 
radiation from a nuclear explosion to neutralize a space object. 8 
The ASAT is generally part of a larger anti-satellite weapons system which, 
in addition to the lethal mechanism, includes the "sensors, control and instru-
mentation necessary for target acquisition, aiming, firing and damage assess-
ment. "9 
Some satellites that are designed primarily to perform other functions have 
ASAT capabilities. These satellites will be referred to as multi-capacity 
satellites. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) intends to deploy lasers on space vehicles to be used for earthquake 
prediction and geological studies from orbit. lo To perform this mission, the 
lasers must be both extremely powerful and have good focusing characteris-
tics. These are the precise qualities necessary for an ASA T. Thus, a laser that 
serves as' a scientific instrument at distances of 40,000 km., can alternatively 
function as a satellite destruction mechanism from a range of 100 km. II 
Another example of a multi-purpose space object is the United States space 
shuttle. One of these functions, according to the Soviet Union, is to serve as an 
ASAT,l2 The ability of the shuttle to track and rendevous with other space ob-
4. Christol, Article Four of the 1967 Principles Treaty: Its Meaning and Prospects For Its Clarification, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE 192 (M. Schwartz ed. 
1979) [hereinafter cited as Christol]. 
5. /d. at 193. ASAT is sometimes used in a broader sense to include systems with earth-to-
space and space-to-earth capabilities. /d. at 207 n.t. This Comment shall deal with space-to-
space systems only. 
6. Tsipis, US-USSR Confrontation or Cooperation in Space, in NINETEENTH STRATEGY FOR PEACE: 
CONFERENCE REPORT 15 (Stanley Foundation ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Tsipis]. 
7. /d. Robinson, Soviets Pushfor Beam Weapon, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 2,1977, at 16 
[hereinafter cited as Robinson]. 
8. Christol, supra note 4, at 194. 
9. Tsipis, supra note 6, at 15. 
10. H. SCOVILLE, JR. & K. TSIPIS, CAN SPACE REMAIN A PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT? 16 
(Stanley Foundation Occasional Paper No. 18, 1978) [hereinafter cited as SCOVILLE & TSIPIS]. 
It. /d. 
12. Soviets See Shuttle as Killer Satel/ite, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 17, 1978, at 17 
[hereinafter cited as Shuttle]; World Television Series, The Real War in Space, Transcript at 13 
(WGBH Educational Foundation 1979) [hereinafter cited as Real War in Space]; The New 
Military, supra note 3, at 149. 
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jects is evidence of its potential to interfere with satellites in space. Once the 
shuttle maneuvers close to another space object, it can use a remote manipula-
tor system13 to either place destructive devices on the object or to bring the ob-
ject on board the shuttle for return to the United States. 14 
B. ASA T Development 
1. The Soviet Union15 
Soviet ASAT testing and development may have started as early as 1962.16 
Kinetic-type ASATs were tested in orbit around the earth between 1968 and 
1971.17 The Soviets discontinued testing in 1971, possibly in deference to the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SAL T).1B However, Soviet testing un-
13. For a description of the remote manipulator system, see). GREY, ENTERPRISE 156 (1979). 
14. Shuttle, supra note 12, at 17. See The New Military, supra note 3, at 149. The Soviets are 
developing their own reusable shuttle and may soon possess the same capability. Covault, Soviets 
Build Reusable Shuttle, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 20, 1978, at 14 [hereinafter cited as Soviet 
Shuttle). 
15. Four basic reasons have been advanced to explain the strong Soviet desire to develop 
ASA Ts. First, the Soviets may desire the ability to destroy American reconnaissance satellites. 
Second, the Soviets may have commenced their ASAT development to counter certain American 
programs such as project "Saint." See notes 26-29 irifra. Third, the Soviets are very concerned 
over the proliferation of space-borne intelligence gathering and other military capabilities of cer-
tain "third nations" such as Communist China, France and West Germany. Their ASAT pro-
grams may be an attempt to counter this perceived threat. Finally, the American space shuttle 
may have prompted ASAT development. Tsipis, supra note 6, at 17-18. Other Soviet concerns in-
clude border security, air and space defense, "various bureaucratic imperatives and the tradi-
tional Soviet penchant for secrecy." Id. at 18. 
16. •• A Soviet antisatellite development and testing program may have had its origins back in 
1962, when Vostok III and IV were maneuvered to within 5 km. of each other." SCOVILLE & 
TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 6. 
Id. 
17. A more suspect program started several years later when on October 19, 1968, the 
Soviet Union orbited Cosmos 248 and a day later launched Cosmos 249 in a rendez-
vous trajectory. The trailer satellite, Cosmos 249, was observed to pass rapidly by the 
presumed target, Cosmos 248, and then exploded. The procedure was repeated ten 
days later with Cosmos 254, which also passed near 248 and exploded, again leaving 
Cosmos 248 intact. A similar experience was repeated two years later on October 20, 
1970 and involved satellites Cosmos 373, 374 and 375, with the last two exploding 
after passing near the first one. In no case was the supposed target satellite destroyed. 
All of these satellites were launched with the large SS-9 launcher. 
18. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are a series of negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union that began in November 1969. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 
BUREAU OF PUBUC AFFAIRS, SALT II AGREEMENT 54 (Selected Document No. 12A 1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Document on SALT II Agreement). SALT's goal is the limitation and 
reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic arms. Id. The first round of negotiations, 
SALT I, were concluded in May 1972 and produced two agreements: The Treaty on the Limita-
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Oct. 3, 1972, United States - Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty), and the In-
terim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, Oct. 3, 1972, United States - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 U.S.T. 3462, 
T.I.A.S. No. 7504. Negotiations for the SALT II Agreement began in November 1972 and yield-
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expectedly resumed in 197619 and the Soviets now have an operational ASAT 
system. 20 In this kinetic system, the Soviet satellite would maneuver near the 
targeted space object and explode, thus knocking out the target with debris. 21 
2. The United States22 
The history of U.S. ASAT development has been marked by indecisiveness 
as to whether or not to pursue such a program. An early U.S. program ini-
tiated in the late 1950' s was terminated or delayed indefinitely in the 
mid-1960's.23 A limited antisatellite program was begun in the 1960's as part 
of America's anti-ballistic missile (ABM) development. 24 This program was 
terminated in 1975. 25 Another project, code named "Saint" (satellite inter-
ed an agreement, a protocol, and aJoint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subse-
quent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms. Document on SALT II Agreement, 
supra, at 54. Seegmerally SALT HANDBOOK(R. Labrie ed. 1979); W. PANOFSKY, ARMS CONTROL 
AND SALT II (1979). 
19. Somewhat unexpectedly the Soviets resumed satellite rendezvous experiments in 
1976 and 1977, with the only difference that the trailer or supposed intercept satellite, 
instead of achieving co-orbital position with the target object after several orbits and 
then exploding, was now launched in a highly elliptical trajectory that brought it near 
the target craft within its first orbit. Then instead of exploding, the trailer was usually 
maneuvered to return to Earth. 
SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 6. See Soviets Test Another Killer Satellite, Av. WEEK & SPACE 
TECH., Jan. 2, 1978, at 21 [hereinafter cited as Soviets Test); Christol, supra note 4, at 194. 
The motivation behind this renewed Soviet interest in antisatellite capability is not 
clear. Perhaps this was a Soviet response to China's then recently demonstrated capaci-
ty to place into orbit 2000-4000 kg. satellites that could be used either for reconnais-
sance, target location for their strategic nuclear weapons, or for military communica-
tions. The Soviet Union may want to deny these assets to the Chinese in case of war be-
tween these two countries. The Soviets could also be preparing to counter the presumed 
extensive U.S. use of outer space for wartime military purposes. 
SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 6. 
20. Middleton, supra note 3, at 8; Weinraub, Brown Says Soviets Can Fell Satellites, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 5,1977, i A, at 11, col. 6; Hunt in Space, supra note 3, at 26, col. 1; Burt, Soviet Said to Ask 
Space Shuttle Halt, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1979, at 6, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Burt, Sovut); 
Zimmerman, Are We Girding for 'Laser Wars' in Space?, MACHINE DESIGN, Dec. 8, 1977, at 20 
[hereinafter cited as Zimmerman); SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note. 1 0, at 6; The New Military, supra 
note 3, at 142. 
"Analysis of 14 Soviet killer satellite tests conducted since October, 1968, shows that the 
USSR has developed an operational killer satellite system that can function in at least three dif-
ferent attack modes at different altitudes and oribtal inclinations." U. S. Funds Killer Satellite Ef-
fort, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 6, 1978, at 19 [hereinafter cited as u.s. Funds). See The New 
Military, supra note 3, at 142. 
21. Sovuts Test, supra note 19, at 21. 
22. Current American ASAT development is basically a response to Soviet ASAT programs. 
14 WEEKLY CaMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1135, 1137 Oune 20, 1978) [hereinafter cited as PRES. Doc. of 
June 20, 1978). U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated that the U.S. is increasingly 
dependent on space and cannot permit the Soviets to attain a dominant position in ASA T 
capability. Real War in Space, supra note 12, at 7. 
23. Christol, supra note 4, at 194. 
24. /d. See note 18 supra. 
25. Christol, supra note 4, at 194. 
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ceptor),26 involved an American effort to develop a payload that would have 
the capability of co-orbiting with and inspecting unknown space objects. 27 
Such a system may have had the potential to directly interfere with orbiting 
space objects. 28 "Saint" was terminated before any test flights were made. 29 
The American ASA T effort came to a standstill after these programs and 
probably would have remained that way had the Soviets not resumed ASA T 
testing in 1975. 30 The new Soviet tests resulted in a reassessment of the situa-
tion by the Ford Administration. Two days before he left office in 1977, 
Gerald Ford ordered the rapid development and deployment of an American 
ASAT to counter the Soviet weapon. 31 
Jimmy Carter entered the Presidency in 1977 with a philosophy of "maxi-
mum pacification of space. "32 He put a limit on ASAT spending, limited 
work to development of ASA T technology only and ordered a new study of the 
matter. 33 This study by the National Security Council changed the Carter Ad-
ministration's outlook. The President has since indicated that he will lift his 
ban on testing if Soviet-American efforts to ban ASATs fail. 34 
It is generally acknowledged that the Soviet Union has a lead over the 
United States in ASAT development. 35 To offset the Soviet advantage, the 
United States will spend between $400 and $500 million in development pro-
grams. 36 Because American technology is superior to that of the Soviet Union, 
some strategists estimate that the United States can close this gap in a relative-
ly short period of time. 37 In fact, American ASATs may be operational as 
early as 1981. 38 
26. Tsipis, supra note 6, at 18. 
27. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 94th CONG., 2D SESS., 
REPORT ON SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75 OVERVIEW, FACIUTIES AND HARDWARE, 
MANNED AND UNMANNED FUGHT PROGRAMS, BIOASTRONAUTICS, CIVIL AND MILITARY Ap· 
PUCATIONS, PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PLANS 395 (Comm. Print 1976). 
28. !d. 
29. [d. 
30. "The United States finds itself under increasing pressure to field an anti-satellite capabil-
ity of its own in response to Soviet activities in this area." PRES. Doc. of June 20, 1978, supra note 
22, at 1137. 




35. See, e.g., id. at 136; Real War in Space, supra note 12, at 1. 
36. Shuttle, supra note 12, at 17. The United States is evaluating three ASAT systems: I) a 
homing intercept warhead system which operates as a heat-seeking rocket-powered ramming 
device. Zimmerman, supra note 20, at 26; The New Military, supra note 3, at 145; 2) an advanced 
system with laser capability, i.e., directed energy ASATs. Covault, U.s. Pushes Antisaullite Effort, 
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 17, 1978, at 14; and 3) a conventional spacecraft system. !d. 
37. SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 10. See Satellite War-Games, the Latest Score, WIRELESS 
WORLD, Jan. 1978, at 36 [hereinafter cited as War-Games]. 
38. Zimmerman, supra note 20, at 20. 
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3. Future ASA T Development 
Existing ASATs are kinetic types. In the future, ASATs will probably 
employ a directed energy lethal mechanism. A directed energy ASAT will 
have certain advantages over kinetic types. It can launch an attack from a 
distance of several thousand kilometers and disable enemy vehicles without 
maneuvering to intercept the target. 39 Other advantages stem from the fact 
that the directed energy beam travels at the speed of light. Such ultra high 
speed attack would be sudden and would not result in the warning time that a 
kinetic ASA T would provide, 40 Furthermore, the directed energy system is 
characterized by greater accuracy.41 Both the U.SY and the U.S.S.R.43 are 
developing beam weapons and high energy lasers. Experts estimate that these 
systems may be functional within 20 years. 44 
III. THE IMPACTS OF ASATs 
There are large numbers of potential military targets in space. Since the 
launching of Sputnik in 1957, outer space has been an area of considerable 
militarization. 4s In fact, well over half of the space efforts of both the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. have been devoted to various military purposes.46 In addition, 
many of the remaining space programs may have an as yet unknown military 
role. 47 The satellite's role in defensive, as well as offensive, warfare is increas-
ing.48 A threat to a nation's strategic satellites is a threat to a nation's security. 
39. Beam Weapon, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 20, 1978, at 13 [hereinafter cited as Beam 
Weapon]. 
40. Soviet Breakthrough is Reported in Research on an Antimissile Beam, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1979, 
at 3, col. 3; Robinson, supra note 7, at 16. 
41. The New Military, supra note 3, at 138. 
42. U.s. Funds, supra note 20, at 19; War-Games, supra note 37, at 36; Beam Weapon, supra note 
39, at 13. The United States has already successfully tested high energy laser weapons. In one 
test lasers shot down robot planes. Real War in Space, supra note 12, at 9; The New Military, supra 
note 3, at 139. In a more impressive test, the Navy used a prototype laser to bring down an entire 
array of antitank missiles travelling at 450 mph. /d. at 138-39. 
43. Robinson, supra note 7, at 16; u.s. Funds, supra note 20, at 18; The New Military, supra note 
3, at 139-42. 
44. SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 12. 
45. Tsipis, supra note 6, at 15; Christol, supra note 4, at 197. 
46. B. LOVELL, THE ORIGINS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF SPACE EXPLORATION 39 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as LOVELL). At the end of 1972, 66% of Soviet and 52% of American 
payloads were for military purposes. /d. These figures may be conservative as space contains 
many dormant satellites. Dormant satellites are intended for future use and have yet to be ac-
tivated. Therefore, their functions are not easily ascertained. War-Games, supra note 37, at 36. 
Except for prototype ASATs, military space systems are passive systems that support "ter-
restrial" operations. Conversely, active systems initiate and participate directly in hostilities. 
Tsipis, supra note 6, at 15. Communications and reconnaissance satellites are examples of passive 
systems. 
47. LOVELL, supra note 46, at 39. 
48. SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note to, at 8-9. For example, "[a] nation's plan for the strategic 
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In an effort to better safeguard its security, the U.S. is devoting special atten-
tion to the vulnerability of its satellites to attack. +9 New, attack-proof satellites 
are being designed. 50 In some cases, prior to plans for the deployment of 
vulnerable strategic satellites are being re-evaluated. 51 
The fear of attack is having an impact on non-military programs as well. 
Peaceful projects, such as power generation are threatened. 52 Additionally, 
the specter of orbiting ASATs is causing private industry to reconsider their 
own previously planned scientific and commercial space programs. 53 An 
ASAT attack would be a highly provocative incident - one that could be con-
exploration of Space and the knowledge gained in such exploration may have a more decisive 
bearing upon the outcome of a contest between nations than any tactical engagement on earth." 
S. BHAlI", STUDIES IN AEROSPACE LAW FROM COMPEllllON TO COOPERATION 163 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as BHAlT). 
49. PRES. Doc. of June 20, 1978, supra note 22, at 1137; Klass, Satellite Vulnerability Fixes Em· 
plulsized, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 24, 1977, at 58 [hereinafter cited as Klass). 
50. Zimmerman, supra note 20, at 26; Real War in Space, supra note 12, at 10; Klass, supra 
note 49, at 58. 
The Department of Defense is currently concentrating on methods for "hardening" the hulls 
of military satellites. Such methods employ protective plates and the use of wiring and sensitive 
instrumentation that is less vulnerable to heat, laser beams and bursts of X-rays from nuclear ex· 
plosions in space. The New Military, supra note 3, at 149. 
Future defense measures may include satellites with the capability to perform evasive 
maneuvers thus enabling them to dodge ASATs. There is also the possibility ofthe employment 
of a fleet of" dark" satellites. These satellites are constructed with radar-absorbing exteriors that 
make them nearly undetectable to enemy radar. Zimmerman, supra note 20, at 26; Middleton, 
supra note 3, at 8. Satellites may even be armed with weapons enabling them to fire back at an 
enemy ASAT. The New Military, supra note 3, at 149. Nevertheless, 
Space· based systems, either defensive or offensive, cannot be securely protected. Hard· 
ening them, deploying decoys, providing a measure of maneuverability, or placing 
them in orbits that permit several hours warning time of an impending attack can offer 
a degree of safety by complicating the problems of the attacker. But a determined 
adversary, willing to undertake the colossal costs associated with space war fighting, 
can destroy or render ineffective any space platform. 
SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 12·13. 
51. For example, the U.S. NAVSTAR Ground Positioning Satellite (GPS) system that 
can position missiles and aircraft with an accuracy of 10 meters in three dimensions 
anywhere on Earth could when available be an important part of weapons delivery 
systems. There are now no specific plans to use it or particularly to rely on it for guid· 
ance of ballistic or cruise missiles because in part, at least, it is subject to destruction 
by some future Soviet anti-satellite system. 
/d. at 18. 
52. /d. at 22. For information on space power production, see Hertzberg & Billman, High 
E"ergy Laser ApplicatitmS, AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS, Mar. 1979, at 16. 
53. Now the promise of new industrial techniques and methods (for example, materials 
processing in a zero-g/high vacuum environment) may encourage a much larger ex-
tension of the earth's economy into space. The extent to which the safety of such pro-
grams can be guaranteed, either by negotiated peace or by active defense, will be a 
central consideration in corporate and national decisions to invest in costly space pro-
grams. While the scope and direction of "space industrialization" remain uncertain, 
... the presence of armed systems in space (intended to destroy space systems) would 
severely discourage industrial exploitation of the exoatmospheric environment. 
Tsipis, supra note 6, at 17. 
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sidered an act of war. 54 Therefore, an ASAT attack would probably not occur 
in peacetime. 55 However, it has been suggested that ASATs could be used in 
situations far short of nuclear exchange. 56 ASAT capability will enable a state 
to eliminate an enemy's defensive space systems and, as a result, the very ex-
istence of ASATs is militarily destabilizing. 57 ASATs may speIrthe beginning 
of a new era of militarization of outer space. They are already the focus of an 
expensive arms race that may dangerously accelerate. 58 
IV. ASATs AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Sources oj Space Law 
The laws applicable to the surface of earth can, to some extent, be extended 
and applied to outer space. 59 However, conditions in outer space are so differ-
ent from those on earth that a new bodyoflaw is taking shape to deal with new 
circumstances occurring beyond earth's airspace. 6o This new body of law is 
outer space law.61 Outer space law is still in the developmental stage. 62 Many 
legal questions have been left unanswered. 63 Scientific research is yielding 
54. SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 8; Tsipis, supra note 6, at 16. 
55. Christol, supra note 4, at 200. 
56. SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 19. 
57. Christol, supra note 4, at 200; Friedberg, What SALT Can (and Cannot) Do, 23 FOR. POL'Y 
92, 98 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Friedberg]. 
58. See SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 19; Real War in Space, supra note 12, at 7; 
Christol, supra note 4, at 204. See also note 3 supra. 
59. O. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 25 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as OGUNBANWO]. . 
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, for an extensive discussion of the problems of 
delineating the boundary between air space and outer space and the various alternatives that 
have been proposed see Goedhius, The Changing Legal Regiml! oj Air and Outer Space, 27 INT"L & 
COMPo L. Q. 576, 589-93 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Goedhius, Changing Legal Regime]. See note 
106 infra. 
60. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 76 (A. Piradoved. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Piradov]; P. 
JANKOWITSCH, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN OUTER SPACE 20-21 (Stanley Foundation Oc-
casional Paper No. 11, 1976) [hereinafter cited as J ANKOWITSCH]. See Goedhius, Changing Legal 
Regime, supra note 59, at 577-78. 
61. J. MORENOFF, WORLD PEACE THROUGH SPACE LAW 1-14 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
MORENOFF]; C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 471 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RHYNE]; 
JANKOWITSCH, supra note 60, at 20. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 117 (5th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARZENBERGER]. ' 
62. MORENOFF, supra note 61, at 1-14; RHYNE, supra note 61, at 471;JANKOWITSCH, supra note 
60, at 20. 
63. Robinson, Militarization and the Outer Space Treaty - Time for a Resta/eml!nt of "Space Law, " 
ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS, Feb. 1978, at 28 [hereinafter cited as Robinson, Militarization]. 
Some legal questions have been deliberately left unanswered. For example, the United States op-
poses the establishment of a legal definition of the physical boundaries of outer space. It argues 
that technological developments in the aerospace field are so ~npredictable that assigning a 
definite boundary at this time is premature. Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and West 
Germany support the U.S. position. See LEGAL SUS-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, THE QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION AND/OR THE DELIMITA-
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technology that enables man to explore and exploit the heavens in ways that 
were unimaginable only a short time ago. Such unforeseen advancements will 
have profound legal effect. Not only will they result in the exposition of new 
areas where space law must develop, but they will also result in existing space 
law being deemed inadequate. 64 Much of international law on earth is derived 
from principles of customary international law. However, because the space 
age is such a recent phenomenon, the practice of states has not had enough 
time to result in the development of international legal principles based on the 
practice of states. 65 Therefore, the primary source of outer space law is 
positive law. 66 
B. Positive Law Affecting ASA Ts 
1. United Nations Resolutions 
Several resolutions relating to ASATs were passed by the United Nations 
General Assembly in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Outer Space Res-
olution, U.N. Resolution 1348 (XIII)67 passed on December 13, 1958, ex-
pressed the desire "to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into 
[outer space]" and established the Ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS).68 
U.N. Resolution 1884 (XVIII)69 [Resolution 1884] was passed on October 
17, 1963. Resolution 1884 called upon states to refrain from orbiting weapons. 
It specifically asked the United States and the Soviet Union to affirm their in-
tentions of not placing "objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of 
weapons of Mass destruction" into outer space. 70 
TION OF OUTER SPACE 8-12, U.N. Doc. AlAC. 105/C.217 Add. 1 (Background Paper Prepared 
by the Secretariat 1977) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL SUB-COMMITTEE, OUTER SPACE]. 
64. COOPERATION OR CONFRONTATION IN OUTER SPACE: THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE ON THE 
UNITED NATIONS OF THE NEXT DECADE 48 (Stanley Foundation ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 
THIRTEENTH REPORT]. 
It is interesting to note how increased technology has effected the Soviet Union's view towards 
reconnaissance satellites. At first Russia viewed all military uses of outer space, including the use 
of reconnaissance satellites, as illegal. In 1962, the USSR took the position that military uses 
were not ipso facio illegal. Only aggressive military acts, which included the use of reconnaissance 
satellites, were illegal. By 1964, the Soviets had developed their own reconnaissance satellites. 
They hushed their protests against such satellites and began to deploy their own. Address by Dr. 
D. Goedhuis, Harvard Law School (Sept. 28, 1967). 
65. Piradov, supra note 60, at 75. Some authorities feel that a customary space law has had 
adequate time to develop regarding some issues. For example, since space-crafts have never been 
seriously challenged as they travel above foreign territories, a customary practice has been estab-
lished allowing such space-crafts to travel freely above any nation on earth. See BHATT, supra note 
48, at 92. 
66. Piradov, supra note 60, at 74. 
67. G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 5, U.N. Doc. Al4009 (1958). 
68. /d. 
69. G.A. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 13, U.N. Doc. A/5571 (1963). 
70. /d. 
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Two Resolutions, U. N. Resolution 1962 (XVIII): Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space71 and U. N. Resolution 1963 (XVIII): International Cooperation in 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space72 were passed on December 13, 1963. These 
resolutions set out principles and concepts later expressed in the 1967 Treaty 
on Outer Space73 including the necessity of avoiding war in space and the de-
velopment of outer space for peaceful purposes. 74 
While an extensive discussion of the effects of United Nations' resolutions is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is generally accepted that a resolution 
does not impose any legal obligation upon United Nations Members. 75 
Resolutions are not legislative actions and any member that wishes to dissent 
may continue to do SO.76 Nevertheless, a resolution is not completely without 
effect. It represents a measure of agreement among United Nations Members 
and, as such, makes it politically unattractive for dissenting members to act in 
a manner contrary to its provisions. 77 Therefore, while not establishing rigid 
laws, the above resolutions demonstrated the international consensus that 
outer space should be a peaceful environment free from nuclear weapons and 
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. 78 
2. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water (Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) went into force for the 
United States and the Soviet Union on October 10, 1963. 79 The Treaty's pre-
amble recited that the parties desired "to put an end to the contamination of 
man's environment by radioactive substances. "80 It may be concluded that 
71. G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U;N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 14, U.N. Doc. A/5656 (1963). 
72. G.A. Res. 1963, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5656 (1963). 
73. See S IV.B.3 infra. 
7 ~. Galloway, Space Law and Astronautics for Peace and Human UntiersllJnding, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE 178 (M. Schwartz ed. 1979) (hereinafter 
cited as Galloway]. 
75. L. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS 282 (1959) [hereinafter cited as GOODRICH]; I. 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1~ (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
BROWNLIE]. For more information on the legal significance of United Nations resolutions, see J. 
CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1969); Cheng, United Nations 
Resolutions on Outer Space: "InsllJnt" International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. 23-~8 (1965); 
ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS (1966). 
76. GOODRICH, supra note 75, at 202. 
77. !d.; BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 14. 
78. For definitions of "nuclear weapons" and "weapons of mass destruction," see S IVB.3.a 
i'!fra. 
79. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
80. !d. 
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the Treaty's ban on nuclear tests in outer space precludes parties from testing 
ASATs employing nuclear lethal mechanisms beyond earth's airspace. 
3. The Space Treaty 
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
of January 27, 196781 (Space Treaty) is perhaps the most important treaty in 
the field of space law. 82 The Space Treaty, "embodies the international intent 
as well as broad guiding legal principles, of cooperation and restraint in ex-
ploring and exploiting space. "83 
Article IV is the key provision of the Space Treaty84 and is the provision 
that most directly affects ASATs. Article IV reads as follows: 
Article IV 
(1) States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit 
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any 
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons 
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any 
other manner. 
(2) The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all 
states Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The 
establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the 
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military man-
euvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military 
personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes 
shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility 
necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial 
bodies shall also not be prohibited. 85 
Since the Space Treaty was accepted by the General Assembly, Article IV 
has been the subject of varying interpretations. 86 Many of these interpreta-
tions center on certain critical words and phrases left undefined in the 
Treaty.87 Nevertheless, there is general agreement on several issues. 
81. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of January 27,1967,18 U.S.T. 
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Space Treaty]. 
82. The Space Treaty is the principle source of international space law. Hearings &fore the Sub-
comm. on Space Scimee and Application of the House Comm. on Scimee and Technology, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3 (1976) (statement of Carl Christol). 
83. Robinson, Militarization, supra note 63, at 26. 
84. Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings &fore the &nate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Executive D, 90th 
Cong., lst Sess. 22 (1967) (statement of Arthur Goldberg) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Space 
Treaty). 
85. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. IV. 
86. OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 30; Robinson, Militarization, supra note 63, at 27. 
87. The Treaty contains many unclear terms. See Robinson, Militarization, supra note 63, at 27. 
478 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. III, No.2 
a. Weapons Prohibited Under Article IV 
Article IV of the Space Treaty prohibits "nuclear weapons or any other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction." This same phrase was first used in 
U . N. Resolution 1884.88 Unfortunately, the terms "nuclear weapons" and 
"weapons of mass destruction" have never been defined. 
"Nuclear weapons" may be the easier of the two terms to define. "It may 
be presumed that all arms which utilize atomic energy in accomplishing their 
intended purpose, irrespective of their size or destructive force, would be 
regarded as nuclear weapons:"89 Hence, the nature ofthe nuclear weapon and 
not its destructive capacity is the determining factor. "Weapons of mass 
destruction" is somewhat more difficult to define. It is generally agreed that 
conventional weapons, e.g., those whose lethal. mechanism employs gun-
powder and other conventional components do not constitute weapons of mass 
destruction.90 Conversely, unconventional weapons, e.g., nuclear, chemical 
and bacteriological weapons, are considered weapons of mass destruction. 91 
Again, as in the case of nuclear weapons, the destructive capacity of un-
conventional weapons is not important. They are, by their very nature, 
weapons of mass destruction. However, destructive capacity is related to the 
classification of new weapons. In the event that a new weapon cannot be cate-
gorized as conventional or non-conventional, it will be considered a weapon of 
mass destruction if its destructive impact is one of 'catastrophic' proportions.92 
The form of the weapon itself may also be critical. A strict interpretation of 
the phrase "any objects carrying" would ban only objects carrying specified 
weapons and not the weapons themselves. 93 Thus, a satellite carrying a pro-
hibited weapons system is banned. However, if the satellite itself is the 
weapon, it may not be prohibited by this phrase. Perhaps this is why the 
United States is developing a "ramming/collision" ASAT which is itself a 
E.g., the Treaty did not define "outer space." Hearings on Space Treaty, supra note 84, at 11 (state-
ment of Arthur Goldberg). 
88. See note 69 supra. 
89. S. GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES & PROSPECTS 86 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as GOROVEJ. 
90. [d.; Hearings on Space Treaty, supra note 84, at 23, 76 (statement of Arthur Goldberg); The 
New Military, supra'note 3, at 142. 
91. Hearings on Space Treaty, supra note 84, at 100 (statement of Cyrus Vance); id. at 23, 76 
(statement of Arthur Goldberg); OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 92; GOROVE, supra note 89, at 
86. 
92. Hearings on Space Treaty, supra note 84, at 23 (statement of Arthur Goldberg). A catastrophic 
impact is one whose magnitude is equivalent to that of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon. 
[d. at 23, 76 (statement of Arthur Goldberg); id. at 100 (statement of Cyrus Vance). Weapons 
whose maximum destructive impact would affect less than 20 to 30 people probably would not be 
considered as one of catastrophic proportions. GOROVE, supra note 89, at 87. Lasers have been 
categorized as weapons of mass destruction. !d. at 87. 
93. [d. at 88. 
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weapon rather than an object carrying a weapon. 9• Article IV(l) prohibits ob-
jects carrying weapons with unconventional lethal mechanisms. It does not 
prohibit objects carrying conventional weaponry. New weapons that cannot 
be categorized as conventional or non-conventional will be banned if their 
destructive impact is one of catastrophic proportions. If the object is the 
weapon, it may not be prohibited. 
b. Physical Jurisdiction of Article IV 
The historical rule of usque ad coelum extended a state's territorial jurisdiction 
upwards to infinity. 95 Thus, outer space was considered to be within the sover-
eignty of subjacent states. 96 This view has since been rejected97 both by state 
practice9S and by Article II of the Space Treaty" which declares space "the 
province of mankind" and "not subject to national appropriation."loo Never-
theless, a state's complete sovereignty over its airspace is indisputable. 101 
Outer space begins where airspace ends. 102 Hence, there is a boundary below 
which a subjacent state may exercise 'full sovereignty and above which there 
94. See note 36 supra. 
95. The phrase cuius est solum tius est usque ad coelum et al (he who owns the ground owns every-
thing to the heavens and to the depths) is taken from ancient Roman law. R. SWIFT, INTERNA· 
TIONAL LAW: CURRENT AND CLASSIC 179-80 (1969); J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS 212 
(1974). See RHYNE, supra note 61, at 471; G. GAL, SPACE LAW 65-67 (1969); Hopkins, Legal Im-
plications of Remote Sensing of Earlh Resources by Satellites, 78 MIL. L. REV. 57, 77 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as Hopkins]. 
96. /d.; stt BHA1T, supra note 48, at 114. 
97. One theory rejecting state sovereignty in outer space is based on the idea that the territory 
subjacent to a point in space constantly changes as the earth rotates. This differs from the at-
mosphere which rotates with the earth. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 61, at 117. 
98. Gorove, Sovereignty and the Law ofOuttr Space Reexamined, 2 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 
311,313 (1977); Hopkins, supra note 95, at 77. 
99. Hopkins, supra note 95, at 77. 
100. /d. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. II. 
101. Both the Paris Convention of 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 174, and the Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation of December 7,1944,61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 
recognize a state's sovereignty over its superjacent airspace. See F. NOZARI, THE LAW OF OUTER 
SPACE 113 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NOZARI]. 
102. LAY & T AUBENFIELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 39 (1970); 
OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 31,62; Piradov, supra note 60 at 27; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra 
note 61, at 117; D. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GRIEG]. 
There are those who disagree with this two-zone approach and, instead, maintain that a multi-
zone approach should be adopted. Under one such scheme, there would be three zones, the 
lowest of which would consist of territorial space-'lnder the complete sovereignty of the subjacent 
state. In the second, middle zone, the state would still maintain limited sovereignty subject to a 
right of transit by other states. The third and highest zone, stretching out to infinity, would not 
be subject to sovereignty and would be "free for passage of all instrumentalities." F. NOZARI, 
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 115 (1973). See HaarllJppel, Airspace, Outtrspace and Mesospace, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 160 (M. Schwartz 
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Haanappel]. 
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can be no exercise of state sovereignty,'03 Yet, due to the lack of physical 
definitions of both airspace and outer space, the exact boundary remains 
uncertain. 104 
Article IV bars the stationing of prohibited weapons" in outer space in any 
. . . manner." 105 However, it is not certain whether outer space would include 
the orbital altitude at which ASATs operate. 106 Fortunately, Article IV begins 
with the phrase "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit 
around the earth ... " (emphasis supplied).,07 This wording helps to avoid 
potential problems created by the lack of a physical definition of outer space. 
As a result, the Space Treaty bars "any objects carrying nuclear weapons or 
any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction",08 from orbit around the 
103. Piradov, supra note 60, at 27; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 61, at 117; .GRIEG, supra 
note 102, at 286. 
104. See note 102 supra. 
105. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. IV(I). 
106. There are a variety of suggested definitions of outer space. See, e.g., OGUNBANWO, supra 
note 59, at 50-58; BHAlT, supra note 48, at 97; NOZARI, supra note 101, at 114-17; THIRTEENTH 
REPORT, supra note 64, at 7-8; Haanappel, supra note 102, at 160; jANKowlTSCH, supra note 60, 
at 20; Almond, Definition and/or Delimitation ofOuterSpace, in PROCEEDINGS OFTHE TWENTy-FIRST 
COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE 77 (M. Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Almond). Most 
of these authorities consider the altitudes at which airplanes'operate to be within air space and the 
altitudes beyond satellite orbit as outer space. 
It is generally agreed that the lowest perigee of satellite orbit is in outer space. Hearings on Space 
Treaty, supra note 84, at 29 (statement of Arthur Goldberg); id. at 17 (statement of Dean Rusk). 
Yet some nations located in equatorial regions claim sovereignty over geosynchronous orbit areas 
above their respective territories. See Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (277th mtg.), 16 U.N. GAOR 3, U.N. Doc. AlAC 105/C.2/SR.277 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Legal Sub-Committee). A satellite is considered to be in geosynchronous or-
bit when its altitude and speed are controlled to give it an orbital period of24 hours, i.e" the time 
it takes for the earth to complete one rotation. COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, 
PROSPECTUS 9-10 (1964), cited in Hearings on Satellite Communications Before the Military Operation Sub· 
Committee on the House Committee on Government Operation, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 597, 
605-06 (1964). This can be accomplished above the earth's equator. /d, Once placed in orbit, the 
geosynchronous satellite remains relatively stationary above the same point on the earth's sur-
face. Id. The sovereignty claim on the geosynchronous satellite orbit area is based on a theory 
that the existence of the geostationary orbit is dependent on the earth's gravity and, therefore, 
such orbits do not fall within the concept of outer space. Instead, the segment of the geostationary 
orbit above a nation is considered that nation's natural resource within its sovereign control. 
Legal Sub-Committee, supra, at 3. During December and November of 1976, representatives of 
Brazil, Columbia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire - all equatorial 
countries - met in Bogota, Columbia. At the meeting it was declared, inter alia, "that the geosta-
, tionary synchronous orbit is a physical fact linked to the reality of our planet because its existence 
depends exclusively on its relation to gravitational phenomena generated by the earth, and that is 
why it must not be considered part of the outer space." LEGAL SUS-COMMllTEE, OUTER SPACE, 
supra note 63, at 10 n.ll. These problems are becoming increasingly important. See Wilford, A 
'TrafficJam'in Outer Space, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24,1980, at DI, col. 3. 
It is also argued that, until a definition of outer space is formally agreed upon, nothing can 
legally prevent a nation from going as high above its territory as its capabilities permit in order to 
exercise its sovereignty. BHAlT, supra note 48, at 104. 
107. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art IV. 
108. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. IV(I). 
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earth. The phrase, "orbit around the earth" intimates a full orbit and not a 
fractional orbit or suborbital flight. 109 Thus, intercontinental ballistic mis-
silesllo (ICBMs) with nuclear warheads that pass through satellite altitudeslll 
and the fractional orbiting bombardment systemll2 (FOBS) (which travels in a 
partial or "fractional" orbit) are not prohibited under Article IV. 113 
c. Article IV(2): The Peaceful Purpose Clause 
Article IV(2)IH which includes the "peaceful purpose" clause, apparently 
does not add any further limitations to ASATs. The Article states that: "the 
moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty 
exclusively for peaceful purposes." Hence, on its face, peaceful purposes ap-
ply only to "the moon and other celestial bodies." The omission of the term 
"outer space" probably was not accidental.1I5 The drafters of the Space 
Treaty did not intend to enact a broad prohibition of military activity, and 
thus carefully constructed Article IV accordingly. 116 The absence of the term 
"outer space" in the peaceful purpose clause appears to be a clear manifesta-
tion of their intent.1I7 
However, certain writers argue that "peaceful purposes" are applicable to 
outer space. This argument is based on a theory that the various articles must 
109. GOROVE, supra note 89, at 87. 
This interpretation implies that the object must have been placed into full orbit 
around the earth rather than into a fractional orbit but it leaves open the question 
whether or not the object must have actually completed at least one full orbit before it 
could come under the Treaty's prohibition. 
/d. at 87 n.7. 
110. /d. at 87. "Intercontinental Ballistic Missile" (ICBM) can be defined as a "land-based 
fixed or mobile rocket-propelled vehicle capable of delivering a warhead to intercontinental 
ranges." Document on SALT II Agreement, supra note 18, at 52. 
III. OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 98. 
112. The fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) employs "a missile that achieves an 
orbital trajectory but fires a set of retrorockets before the completion of one revolution in order to 
slow down, reenter the atmosphere, and release the warhead it carries into a ballistic trajectory 
toward its target." /d. 
113. OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 98. 
114. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. IV(2). 
115. GOROVE, supra note 89, at 88. Dr. Roy of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(IACO) does not feel that the peaceful purpose clause applies to outer space. His position has 
been summarized as follows: 
By analyzing the other articles [of the Space Treaty) we can see that every article says 
"the Moon, other celestial bodies and outer space" except Article IV in which it is only 
said, "the Moon and other celestial bodies." Therefore, it is clear that the intention 
was present to exclude outer space from Article IV. 
Summary of Discussions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENfH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER 
SPACE 114 (1967). See Zedalis & Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons arulthe Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 8 
CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 454, 476 n.80 [hereinafter cited as Zedalis & Wade). 
116. Robinson, Militarization, supra note 63, at 27. 
117. GOROVE, supra note 89, at 88-89. 
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be interpreted together as a whole and not in an isolated, separate manner. 118 
U sing this method of analysis, the jurisdiction of Article IV( 1) would expand 
through Article XIII which states that the "provisions of !the/ Treaty shall ap-
ply to activities in . . . outer space . . . including the moon and other celestial 
bodies" 119 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the prohibition of Article IV( 1) 
would be supplemented by Article I which allows for the use of space only for 
the benefit of all countries120 and by Article IV(2), the "peaceful purpose" 
clause. 121 Hence, under this view, parties to the Space Treaty may use outer 
space only for "peaceful purposes." Unfortunately, the meaning of "peaceful 
purposes" is unclear. 122 
The Space Treaty did not define "peaceful ·purposes. "123 As a result, 
numerous interpretations have been advocated. The two most popular are the 
"nonaggressive" and the" nonmilitary" interpretations. l24 A nonaggressive 
interpretation would allow military personnel and equipment in outer space as 
long as their activities are non aggressive in nature 125 and do not come under 
one of the exceptions specified in the Space Treaty. 126 The United States 
favors the application of this view to outer space, the moon and celestial 
bodies.127 The Soviet Union adopts this approach only with respect to outer 
space. 128 With regards to the moon and other celestial bodies, the Soviets ad-
118. Zedalis & Wade, supra note 115, at 477. 
119. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. XIII. 
120. /d. art. I. 
121. /d. art. IV(2); Zedalis & Wade, supra note 115, at 477; Herczeg, Problems oj Interpretation oj 
the Space Treaty oj27 January 1967, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF 
OUTER SPACE 105, 106-07 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Herczeg). 
122. M. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, AN EXPERIENCE IN TEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 
106 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LACHS); Christol, supra note 4, at 196-97. 
123. OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 30. 
124. /d. at 28-29; LACHS, supra note 122, at 106; GOROVE, supra note 89, at 90. For a discus-
sion of the "non-aggressive" analysis, see Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 
CALIF. L. REV. 507, 514 (1967). For a discussion of the "non-military" analysis, see Markov, 
Against the So-Called "Broader" Interpretation oj the Term "Peac~ful" in International Space Law, in PRO. 
CEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 73,75 (1968). 
125. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a definition of aggression on December 
14, 1974. The definition included the following language: "Aggression is the use of armed force 
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this 
definition." G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
On June 20, 1978, President Carter stated that attacks on the space activities of any nation 
shall be considered infringements of the sovereign rights of that nation. PRES. Doc. of June 20, 
1978, supra note 22, at 1136; see Tsipis, supra note 6, at 14. Thus, the United States may interpret 
an ASA T attack as an act of aggression. 
126. GOROVE, supra note 89, at 90. 
127. Hearings on Space Treaty, supra note 84, at 59 (statement of Sen. Gore); OGUNBANWO, supra 
note 59, at 29. 
128. Zedalis & Wade, supra note 115, at 470 n.59. 
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vocate a nonmilitary interpretation 129 barring all military activity, in addition 
to all aggressive activity, unless such activity qualifies as an exception under 
the Space Treaty. 130 
Both the nonaggressive and the nonmilitary interpretations would permit 
military personnel if they are involved with "scientific research or for any 
other peaceful purposes" and military equipment would be permitted if neces-
sary for "peaceful exploration ofthe moon and other celestial bodies. "131 Fur-
thermore, both interpretations would bar aggressive activity. Thus, an aggres-
sive attack by an ASAT on a satellite would be prohibited. It may also be 
argued that the mere presence of ASATs in space is aggressive. U2 Such an in-
terpretation would ban ASA T deployment. 
d. The Space Treaty and Othl!T Intl!Tnational Legislation Regarding ASA Ts 
Article I of the Space Treaty reads, in part: "Outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all 
States. . . in accordance with international law , . . ." 133 Similarly, Article III 
states, in part: 
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the explor-
ation and use of outer space, including the moon and other celes-
tial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the 
Charter of the United Nations, ... m 
These articles make international law, including the Charter of the United 
Nations, applicable to outer space. 155 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter reads: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.136 
Hence, the threat or use of force, including its preparation, that is prohibited 
129. Jd.; Hearings Oil :ipace '/Tealy, supra note 114, at !i!l (statement 01 Sen. Uore); UGUNBANWO, 
supra note 59, at 90. 
130. GOROVE, supra note 89, at 90. 
131. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. IV. 
132. One view holds that all weapons, defensive as well as offensive, are not peaceful per se and 
are prohibited by the peaceful purpose clause. OCUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 32. However, 
another view considers weapons peaceful per se in that they act as a deterrent to aggressive action. 
/d. 
133. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. I. 
134. /d. art. III. 
135. Dembling, Trealy Oil PrillCiples GoVtTllillg the Activities of Statts ill the Exploratioll alld Use of Ouur 
Space [lIClutiillg tM Mooll and Other Cekstial Bodies, in MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 12 (N. Jasentuliyana 
ed. 1979). 
136. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). 
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on earth is also prohibited in outer space. m Such a prohibition would encom-
pass an ASAT attack by one nation on the space activities of another nation. 138 
e. The Space Treaty and ASA Ts - A Summary 
Under Article IV,139 objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction are banned from orbiting the earth. If the object 
makes less than a full orbit, or if the objects themselves are the weapons or 
carry weapons other than nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, 
they are allowed under Article IV(1)I40 to orbit the earth. 
Authorities do not agree on whether the prohibitions against aggressive ac-
tivity found in the "peaceful purpose" clause'4' apply to outer space. Never-
theless, by extending the application of international law into outer space, Ar-
ticle 111'42 prohibits ASAT activities that constitute a threat or use of force. 
Hence, while certain types of ASATs are not prohibited from orbit, their use 
in an aggressive manner is a violation of international law. 
4. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks'43 (SALT) 
a. SALT p44 
The first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United 
States and the Soviet Union yielded the following provisions among others: 
Article XII 
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with 
the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national 
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consis-
tent with generally recognized principles of international law. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national tech-
137. Herczeg, supra note 121, at 107 (quoting Eilene Galloway). See Busak, Astronauticsfor Peace 
and Human Progress, Problems Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in PROCEE[)[NGS OF THt: 
TWENTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE 173 (M. Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Busak). 
138. The threat or use offorce is barred not only when directed "against the territorial integri-
ty or political indepebdence of any state," but also when used or brandished" in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Thus an attack or any other con-
straint against a ship's aircraft or any other vehicle moving in other dimensions, such as outer 
space, constitutes a violation of law. LACHS, supra note 122, at 106. "The threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of arry state is prohibited." U.N. CHARTER art. 
2(4) (emphasis supplied). The United States would view an ASAT attack as one against the 
political independence ofa state. See note 125 supra. See also Busak, supra note 137, at 173. Never-
thdess, international law does allow the use of ASATs in sdf-defense. See § IV. c infra. 
139. Space Treaty, supra note 81, art. IV. 
140. /d. art. IV(I). 
141. /d. art. IV(2). 
142. /d. art. III. 
143. See note 18 supra. 
lH.ld. 
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nical means of verification of the other Party operating in accord-
ance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 145 
The principal method of "national technical means of verification" 
(NTM)146 is by reconnaissance satellites.147 Therefore, this bilateral agree-
ment implicity bars the parties from interfering with the other nation's recon-
naissance satellites used to verify SALT I. 148 However , SALT I. failed to 
further address the problems presented by ASATs. Non-reconnaissance 
satellites were not covered and no agreement was reached regarding the 
development and testing in outer space of ASATs.149 
b. SALT 1/ 
If ratified, SALT II will have a significant effect on the American and 
Soviet development of ASATs. Article IX(l)(c) of the Treaty prohibits the 
parties from developing, testing or deploying "systems for placing into 
Earth's orbit nuclear weapOns or any other kind of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, including fractional orbiting missiles. "150 This expands the prohibitions 
of the Space Treaty which only prescribed the placement of these weapons in 
space or in orbit around the Earth and which did not prohibit fractional orbital 
145. ABM Treaty, supra note 18, art. XII. "The Interim Agreement in Article V restated the 
promises set forth in Article XII of the Treaty." Christol, supra note 4, at 199. 
146. "National technical means of verification" (NTM) was not defined in either SALT I or 
SALT II. Military Implicalions of 1M Treaty on 1M Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol 
Tlureto (SALT 11 Treaty): Hearings Before 1M Commiltee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 734·35 
(1979) (statement of Lt. General Edward Rowny, U.S. Army). It has been suggested that NTM 
was undefined on purpose and that the Soviets and Americans disagree on the definition of 
NTM. Id. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance disagrees and believes that 
there is an understanding between the United States and the Soviets that national 
technical means can be described broadly as technical information collection systems 
used for verifying compliance with agreements and which operates from outside the na· 
tional territory of the other state. In SALT I the United States described NTM in these 
terms and the Soviet side stated that thre was no substantive difference between us on 
this point. 
!d. at 502 (statement by Cyrus Vance). 
147. "The term 'national technical means of verification' has come to mean principally space 
objects, and in particular observation-type satellites. Although national technical means are not 
limited to observation satellites, they are an exceedingly important aspect of the information 
gathering process." Christol, supra note 4, at 199-200. 
148. SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 5, IS; THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 64, at 23; 
War-Games, supra note 37, at 36. The intent of the parties was made explicit during the SALT I 
negotiations. "In the early stages of the SALT negotiations, the United States brought up the 
principle of guaranteeing the sanctity of reconnaissance satellites for verification purposes, and 
the Soviet Union concurred with this principle." SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 15. 
149. !d. at 5; War-Games, supra note 37, at 36. 
ISO. Subparagraph I(c) of Article IX reads as follows: 
I. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy: ... 
(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of 
weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles. 
Document on Salt II Agreement, supra note 18, at 41. 
+86 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. III, No.2 
missiles such as the FOBS.15I However, the parties have stipulated that the 
provisions of 1 ( c) of Article IX do not require the dismantling or destruction of 
any existing launchers of either party. 152 
SALT II, like SALT I, depends on NTM153 and prohibits each side from 
interfering with NTM.154 The Treaty does not define NTM. However, the 
Department of State defined NTM to include photo-reconnaissance satel-
lites155 and added that Article XV(2) "prohibits use of antisatellite systems 
against satellites of the other Party that are used for Treaty verification. "156 
SALT II may have additional significance regarding ASATs. U.S. Secre-
tary of State, Cyrus Vance, stated that American ratification of SALT II will 
help to make future bilateral ASA T negotiations with the Soviet Union suc-
cessful. 157 Conversely, Vance warned that an American failure to ratify SALT 
II will adversely affect the chances for a successful ASA T agreement. 158 
c. The SAL T Agreements - A Summary 
The SALT Agreements are bilateral treaties coming into effect only upon 
ratification by the parties. 1S9 SALT I has been ratified160 and prohibits the 
parties from interfering with each others NTM including satellites used for 
verification purposes. 
Upon ratification, SALT II will reemphasize the prohibitions of SALT I. 
Additionally, it will expand Article IV of the Space Treaty to preclude 
development, testing and deployment of systems for placing into orbit nuclear 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Finally, fractional orbiting missiles 
will be banned. 
151. Id. at 20 
152. /d. at 41. Nevertheless, 
the Soviets have agreed to dismantle or destroy twelve SS-9 launchers at the Tyura-
Tam test range which have been used to test a fractional orbital bombardment system 
(FOBS) several times in the past. Moreover, any fractional orbital missiles in existence 
must be dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the obligation of paragraph 4 of Article 
XI, and such missiles cannot be developed in the future. 
/d. at 20. 
153. Article XV(I) reads as follows: 
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a 
manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 
/d. at 43. 
154. Article XV(2) reads as follows: 
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verifi-
cation of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph I of this Article. 
Id. For the text of paragraph I of this Article, see note 153 supra. 
155. Document on SALT II Agreement, supra note 18, at 21. 
156. I~ . 
157. Mohr, Vance Tells Senate Panel Pact Defeat Would Hurt NATO, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1979, 
at 3, col. 2. 
158. /d. 
159. Document on SALT II Agreement, supra note 18, at 46 (Art. XIX). 
160. See note 18 supra. 
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5. Current Negotiations Regarding ASATs 
a. Background and Negotiations to Date 
487 
At first, the prospects for a bilateral negotiated agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union appeared dim. The Soviets had a comfort-
able lead in ASAT development l61 and did not appear interested in negotia-
tions,, 62 The Soviet lead in ASAT development may also have initially led to 
the reluctance of the United States to negotiate. Without an ASAT capacity of 
its own, the United States would be in a weak bargaining position relative to 
the Soviets,, 63 Hence, the United States began its own ASAT programl64 and 
the space arms race was underway,,65 As the race developed, Soviet and 
American interest in a negotiated settlement grew. This stemmed from a 
Soviet fear that America would produce an ASAT superior to their ownl66 and 
America's reluctance to expend the huge amounts of resources necessary for a 
successful ASAT program,, 67 Thus, in March 1976, when American officials 
offered to negotiate ASATs with the Soviets, the Soviets accepted the invita-
tion. 168 
Preliminary negotiations were held in Helsinki during June 1978 at the re-
quest of President Carter. 169 The parties met again at Berne, Switzerland in 
January and February of 1979.170 However, these talks failed to produce an 
agreement,.,1 A third round oftalks was held in Vienna in late April 1979.172 
These talks ended in a deadlock and it now appears doubtful that the parties 
will reach agreement in the near future"" The parties did not impose a 
161. Burt, u.s. Seelcs /0 Curb 'Killer Satellites,' N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1979, S A, at 17, col. 1 
[hereinafter cited as Burt, U.S.). Sie note 34 supra. 
162. /d.; Burt, Soviet, supra note 20, at 6. 
163. Burt, u.s., supra note 161, S A, at 17, col. 1. The New Mili/ory, supra note 3, at 139; 
Shuttle, supra note 12, at 17; U.S. Funds, supra note 20, at 18. 
164. See S II.B supra. 
165. SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 19; Real War in Space, supra note 12, at 7; The New 
Military, supra note 3, at 136. 
166. The Soviets recognize America's overall technological superiority and fear that an all-out 
American ASAT effort will produce a system superior to theirs. Burt, U.s., supra note 161, § A, 
at 17. See U.s. Optimistic on Killer Satellite Ban, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 26,1978, at 20 
[hereinafter cited as U.s. Optimistic); Friedberg, supra note 57, at 98. 
167. The New Military, supra note 3, at 138. 
168. Killer Tallcs, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 28, 1977, at 13 [hereinafter cited as Killer 
Talks]. 
169. U.s. Optimistic, supra note 166, at 20; Christol, supra note 4, at 201; U.s. and Saviet to 
Resume Tallcs on 'Killer Satellites' on April 23, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1979, at 11, col. 6 [hereinafter 
cited as U.s. and Saviet Tallcs); More Talks are Planned on Anti-Satellite Arms, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 
1979, S D, at 76, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Talks Planned]. 
170. U.s. and Sovitt Tallcs, supra note 169, at 11; Talks Planned, supra note 169; Burt, U.S., supra 
note 161, S A, at 1. 
171. Talks Planned, supra note 169, S D, at 76. 
172. U.s. and Soviet Tallcs, supra note 169, at 11; Third U.S.-Soviet Tallcsin Vienna, N.Y. Times, 
May 1, 1979, at 5, col. 1. 
173. Burt, SOVlel, supra note 20, at 6. 
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moratorium on the development of ASA T SI74 and both sides have continued 
to develop and test ASATs.175 Talks have focused on the possibility oflimiting 
ASATs.176 Throughout the negotiations, the United States made it clear that 
it cannot accept an imbalance in antisatellite weapons stockpiles. 177 
b. Potential Problems 
The United States is seeking to negotiate the dismantling of existing Soviet 
ASAT equipped rockets. 178 American officials concede that it would be dif-
ficult to achieve such an agreementl79 and that the most the Soviets are likely 
to accept will be a prohibition on the testing of new anti satellite systems. 180 
The United States has indicated that it will not allow the Soviets to establish a 
superior ASAT capability. 181 Therefore, a Soviet refusal to dismantle its ex-
isting ASAT weaponry will leave the United States with no alternative other 
than the development of an ASA T system. 182 
The Soviets consider the U. S. space shuttle to be an ASAT.183 In the cur-
rent negotiations the Soviets have raised this issue and have demanded that 
any moratorium on ASAT development must include a cessation of shuttle 
testing. 184 The United States has termed this demand as "totally un-
acceptable." 185 An American official close to the talks stated that the United 
States would neither terminate the shuttle nor slow its development. 186 How-
ever, the United States may be willing to agree not to use the shuttle as an 
ASAT.187 
The United States and the Soviet Union are not the only nations that have 
the capability to exploit outer space for military purp~ses.188 The People's 
174. Killn Talks, supra note 168, at 13. 
175. See S II.B supra. 
176. Christol, supra note 4, at 201. 
177. [d. 
178. Burt, U. S., supra note 161. 
179. ld. 
180. ld. 
181. "Our overall game plan is not to permit the other side to attain unilateral superior-
ity in space," says a top national official. "There are two ways to do it. One is to 
build up our capability until it is at least equivalent. The other is to get [the Soviet 
Union] to get rid of some of [its] capability, with unambiguous verifiability. Either 
one is acceptable to [the Carter] Administration." 
The New Military, supra note 3, at 149. 
182. ld. 
183. See S II.A supra. 
184. Burt, Soviet, supra note 20, at 6; su Shultle, supra note 12, at 17. The Soviets are developing 
their own reusable shuttle. Soviet Shultle, supra note 14, at 14. Therefore, the Soviet challenge of 
the U.S. shuttle may be countered with an American challenge to the Soviet shuttle. Shullle, supra 
note 12, at 17. 
185. Burt, Sovut, supra note 20,at 6. 
186. ld.; Paul Warnke, the former United States Chief Arms Negotiator, has indicated that 
the United States is not willing to abandon the shuttle or even to modify its specifications. Real 
War in Space, supra note 12, at 14. 
187. ld. 
188. Tsipis, supra note 6, at 18, 21-22. 
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Republic of China, The Federal Republic of Germany and France are de-
veloping their own space programs. 119 It is believed that the outer space poten-
tial of these nations is a major motivation behind Soviet ASA T develop-
ment. 190 Thus, a bilateral treaty with the United States may fail to allay all of 
the Soviet concerns. 191 
Even after a bilateral agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United 
States is signed, problems will remain. Unless the agreement calls for launch 
or orbit inspection,192 verification of compliance with an agreement will be dif-
ficult to achieve. Presently, inspection of satellites is not expressly allowed at 
either launch sitesl93 or in orbit. 194 Instead, the parties prefer to rely on remote 
ascertainment. 19S 
The United States has expressed confidence that weapons systems in outer 
space can be detected and monitored by remote technical means. 196 However, 
remote systems are not foolproof. 197 Small numbers of satellites can be secretly 
deployed without being identified. 198 Therefore, isolated deployment of 
ASATs may go undetected. 199 Verification is further complicated by the fact 
that the behavior of many non-military satellites performing peaceful missions 
strongly resemble that of ASA Ts. 200 
President Carter has stated that the United States prefers to limit ASATs 
rather than to deploy them. 201 Yet, in the same statement, Carter warned that 
the United States will vigorously pursue the development of its own ASATs in 
the absence of an agreement. 202 Time may be the greatest obstacle to an effec-
189. /d. 
190. See notes IS, 19 supra. 
191. Tsipis, supra note 6, at 21-22. 
192. An agreement on a provision allowing for launch or orbit inspection is unlikely. Launch 
sights are highly confidential areas and the United States is not apt to open up these sights to 
Soviet inspection and vice versa. The United States would prefer to use technical means of 
verification even though these means are inferior. See Hearings on Space Treaty, supra note 84, at 23 
(statement of Arthur Goldberg); id. at 91 (statement of Cyrus Vance); id.at 98 (statement of 
General Wheeler). 
193. /d. at 23 (statement of Arthur Goldberg). During these hearings, Cyrus Vance stated: 
There is nothing in the ... [Outer Space Treaty) which precludes our inspection of a 
satellite put up by another country. It would be possible for either the United States or 
the Soviet Union to pull up alongside - if the particular orbiting body in which they 
were traveling had that capability - a satellite of another country. 
ld. at 98. Mr. Vance then commented that the Space Treaty allows physical inspection (e.g., 
physical entry) regarding facilities on celestial bodies [Article XII) but does not cover such in-
spection of orbiting vehicles. /d. at 99. 
194. /d. at 23 (statement of Arthur Goldberg). 
195. /d. at 91 (statement of General Wheeler). 
196. /d. at 81 (statement of Cyrus Vance); id. at 95, 98 (statement of General Wheeler). 
197. Tsipis, supra note 6, at 16; SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 17. 
198. Hearings on Space Treaty, supra note 84, at 81 (statement of Cyrus Vance); id. at 89 (state-
ment of General Wheeler). 
199. /d. at 83 (statement of Cyrus Vance). 
200. SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 17; Tsipis, supra note 6, at 14. 
201. PRES. Doc. of June 20, 1978, supra note 22, at 1137; Tsipis, supra note 6, at 14. 
202. /d. There is no moratorium on ASA T development. See note 174 supra. 
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tive agreement. Soviet and American ASAT development continues. Once 
the technology is perfected and the system deployed, the subject matter of the 
negotiations becomes moot. 203 Thus, the longer the talks last, the less likely it 
is that they will be successful. 
c. Legitimate Uses .oj ASA Ts: Force 
International law recognizes the justified use of force in specific circum-
stances. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states in part: "Nothing in 
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security. "204 This "inherent right of self-defense" has 
not been modified, replaced or abrogated by special regulations covering outer 
space, and, consequently, is applicable in outer space. 205 Hence, if a member 
of the United Nations is attacked it may legitimately resort to force in outer 
space under the self-defense exemption. 206 The Soviet Union207 and the 
United States208 apparently subscribe to this view. 209 
203. Real War in Space, supra note 12, at 8; Christol, supra note ~, at 202. 
20~. Article 51 reads: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, un-
til the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council, under the present Charter, to take 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
205. OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 32. 
206. Piradov, supra note 60, at 88-89. There are two self-defense exception theories. The first, 
more popular, theory is a restrictive view which forbids the direct and overt use of armed force 
against other states save in response to a similar use of force. Tucker, Legal Restraints on Coercion, 
in THE UNITED STATES IN A DISARMED WORLD 153, 156-57 (The Washington Center of Foreign 
Policy Research ed. 1966). A second view would allow the use of force to remove a danger or 
threat to a nation. /d. at 1~9-50. 
207. The Soviet view was expressed as follows: 
From the fact that states are obliged to conduct their activities in the exploration and 
use of outer space, including celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, in-
cluding the UN Charter, it does not follow by any means that there cannot be retalia-
tion through or using outer space against an aggressor in the process of legitimate self-
defence. 
In other words, this fact does not amount to a prohibition of the use of outer space for 
military purposes in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which authorizes 
'·'individual or collective self-defence" against aggression. 
Piradov, supra note 60, at 88-89. 
208. The United States apparently'subscribes to this view: 
[IJt is clear that the United States has taken the position that the less than total arms 
control measures of Article ~1) for the entire space environment did not invalidate the 
inherent right of national self-defense pursuant to customary international law and Ar-
ticle 51 of the UN Charter. 
Christol, supra note ~, at 196. 
209. In the past, nations have used the self-defense exception to justify military action when 
19801 LEGALITY Of' ANTlSATELLITES 491 
It has been stated that "a consensus is rapidly growing in the world that a 
State has the right to take protective measures even though the spacecrafts ac-
tivity occurs in space beyond the states territorial area.' '210 Thus, if a state in-
terprets activity in space as sufficiently threatening it can take measures it 
deems appropriate to protect itself. There is no universal interpretation of 
what constitutes a "sufficient threat." In the past, espionage by aerial recon-
naissance has been considered sufficient to justify a military response. The 
U-2 incident is a well known example. 211 A similar incident took place when 
the Soviet Union attacked an American spy plane fifty miles off the Soviet 
coast. 212 This plane was in free airspace, yet it was attacked due to its threaten-
ing nature. 213 Professor Zhukov of the Soviet Union stated, "from the view-
point of the security of a state it makes absolutely no difference from what alti-
tude espionage over its territory is conducted. "214 This may indicate that re-
connaissance satellites are subject to a legitimate ASAT attack. 215 States also 
have an interest in protecting their space activities and may resort to their own 
military capabilities if there is no other basis of protection. 21fi Former 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk hinted that a state may legally use ASATs in 
defense of its own space objects. 217 The United States has also suggested that 
they perceived a threat to their security, e.g., the 1968 United States military intervention in the 
Dominican Republic, see Meeker, The Dominican SitUiltion in the Perspective oj International Law 53 
DEPT STATE BULL. 60 (1965), and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Kovalev, Sovereignty 
and International Duties of Socialist Countries, Pravda, Sept. 25, 1968, repn'nted in N. Y. Times, Sept. 
27,1968, S I, at 3, col. 1. 
2tO. Goedhuis, Commmt II, Currmt Problems in Space Law, 1966 BRIT. INST. INT'L & CaMP. L. 
28, 31 (International Law Series No.6). 
211. Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 836, 840 (1960); United States 
Plane Downed in the Soviet Union, 42 DEPT STATE BULL. 816 (1960); OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 
29. The U-2 was altacked when it was 30 to 40 miles above the U.S.S.R .. Id. at 29. 
212. OnJuly 1,1960, an American RB-47 aircraft was flying an electromagnetic observation 
flight over the Barents Sea. The plane was shot down by the Soviet Air Force at a point fifty miles 
off the Soviet coast. Security Council R9'cts Soviet Complaint Against U. S. in RB-47 Incident Casts 88th 
and 89th Vetoes, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 235-38 (1960) [hereinafter cited as RB-47 Incidmt]. At no 
time during its flight was the plane closer than thirty miles to the Soviet coast. /d. at 235. See 
OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 29. 
213. The Soviet Union charged that the plane was engaged in a "premeditated aggressive 
mission." RB-47 Incident, supra note 212, at 236; OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 29. 
214. OGUNBANWO, supra note 59, at 29. 
215. However, this view of reconnaissance satellites is probably outdated. "Despite an initial 
difference relating to the legality of the use of reconnaissance-type satellites, there is now agree-
ment that such space objects are legal under the Principles Treaty." Christol, supra note 4, at 
205. Both the Soviet Union and the United States deploy reconnaissance satellites. See LOVELL, 
supra note 46, at 37; SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note to, at 6-7; THIRTEEN'rn REPORT, supra note 
64, at 11. Thus, it would be hard for either to justify an altack (armed or legal) on the other. 
216. Almond, supra note t06, at 83. 
217, During the Senate Commiltee Hearings on the Space Treaty, former Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk was asked if state A can take unilateral action against space objects of state B when 
B's objects interfere with the legitimate space activities of A. He responded that Article IV of the 
Space Treaty "does not inhibit, of course, the development of an antisatellite capability in the 
event that shou,Id become necessary." Hearings on Space Treaty, supra note 84, at 26 (statement of 
Dean Rusk). 
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military action may be taken in situations where a violation of the Space 
Treaty has occurred. 
A state having real reason to suspect [a Space Treaty] violation 
would be entitled to challenge the suspected state and, if its reason-
able doubts were not removed, to take appropriate steps to protect 
itself against the effects of a Treaty violation. The extent of these 
rights would, of necessity, depend upon the facts of the particular 
situation. 218 
Thus, it appears that if a state feels sufficiently threatened in or from outer 
space, it can resort to the use of ASATs and argue that such use is legally 
justified. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Most space law scholars agree that further positive law is required to limit 
ASA T development and deployment. This can be accomplished th~ough one 
of several means. One method calls for an expansion of Article IV of the Space 
Treaty. This can be done in at least two ways. The first would be to amend 
Article IV itself. 219 Alternatively, a new treaty could expand the principles 
found in the Space Treaty. 220 The latter method is not new. Since the Space 
Treaty was accepted by the General Assembly in 1967, several of its general 
articles were expanded into full and separate treaties. 221 Article IV could be 
218. Hearings on Space Treaty, supra note 84, at 100 (memorandum of Legal Advisor Leonard C. 
Meeker). 
219. Christol recommends the following specific proposals to revise Article IV: 
Paragraph one should be extended to cover conventional weapons. It is no longer ac· 
ceptable to limit the scope of this paragraph to nuclear or mass destruction-type 
weapons. If there were any doubt whether an ASAT is a conventional weapon, it would 
be desirable to provide specifically that ASATs may not be launched into, tested in, or 
used in the space environment. Further, Article 4( 1) should be revised so that the term 
"place in orbit around the Earth" should read that "States Parties to the Treaty shall 
not attempt to launch a space object that has the capability of orbiting or place in orbit 
around the Earth, the Moon or other celestial bodies .... " etc.-
Christol, supra note 4, at 203. 
Id. 
Article 4(2) should be amended to include outer space, per se, as an area in which the 
command of exclusively peaceful purposes is to apply. To ofTer assurances that such 
purposes will be complied with, the new Article 4 should provide that space objects be 
equipped with docking facilities meeting a common international standard so that in· 
spections could be accomplished by non-national, including multi·national, inspecting 
satellites. 
220. Galloway, supra note 74, at 181; GOROVE, supra note 89, at 94. 
221. Articles V and VIII were the basis for The Agreement on the Rescue and Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Space Objects, Apr. 22, 1968,6 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 
672 U.N.T.S. 119; Article VII was expanded by the Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, Oct. 9, 1973,24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762. Article Xl 
was expanded by the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Sept. 
15,1976,28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480. See Galloway, supra note 74, at 181; GOROVE, supra 
note 89, at 94. 
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expanded in a similar manner in order to provide some detailed prohibitions 
on arms limitations. 222 Such a treaty will resolve some of the serious incon-
sistencies now present in Article IV. 223 
Another suggestion is the gradual pacification of space. To implement this, 
a ban would be imposed on military activity in space. This ban would be fol-
lowed by the gradual step-by-step reservation of single parts of outer space, 
e.g., geostationary orbits, orbits around celestial bodies, etc., for peaceful use 
free from any military activity.224 An alternative would be a bilateral agree-
ment between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such an agreement 
should at least ban the use of ASATs and preferably ban the testing, deploy-
ment and use of ASATs. m The agreement should be policed by a multina-
tional body similar to the bilateral Standing Consultative Commission estab-
lished under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.226 ASAT prohibitions may en-
courage states to deploy other kinds of space weapons systems. Therefore, any 
agreement must proscribe all weapons systems. 227 
Adequate verification is the key to any arms control agreement. Such agree-
ment should explicitly allow for inspection of satellites by manned or un-
manned space objects. 228 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Extensive ASAT development is being conducted by the Soviet Union and 
the United States. The Soviets already have operational ASATs and Ameri-
can ASATs may be functional in less than a year. The resource expenditure 
for this space arms race is staggering and the prospects of ASATs in space is 
causing negative repercussions in other areas of space development. Peaceful 
projects are being reconsidered and cancelled. New satellites are being re-
designed, at great cost and effort, to withstand ASA T attacks. The high ideals 
of the Space Treaty, calling for the peaceful use of outer space, are being 
neglected as space is gradually turned into an armed camp. 
International law has responded in part to the ASA T threat. The Space 
Treaty has prohibited ASA Ts carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of 
mass destruction from orbiting earth. However, the Space Treaty is severely 
222. Galloway, supra note 74, at 181. 
223. GOROVE, supra note 89, at 94. 
224. See Busak, supra note 137, at 173. 
225. SCOVILLE & TSIPIS, supra note 10, at 18-20. 
226. /d. at 18-21. 
227. /d. at 20. 
228. Christol believes that space inspection agreements may be based on existing agr ...... mt·nts 
allowing for the boarding and inspection of foreign vessels in national fishing zon ... s. Christol. 
supra note 4, at 202. Another plan would call for the eventual creation of a multinational !tlubal 
verification institution to police all arm limitation agreements. See Goldblat, Monitoring Arm .. C.m-
trol, Do We Need a Global VeriFICation Institution, in OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISARMAl\It::-lT 6!l. i6 tJ· 
Sharp ed. 1977). 
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limited in its effect. If the objects themselves are ASATs or carry ASATs with 
lethal mechanisms other than those expressly proscribed, they are not pro-
hibited. 
Articles I and III of the Space Treaty incorporate existing international law 
principles, including those expressed in the Charter of the United Nations, in-
to the Treaty. Signatories may not make use of the "threat or use of force. " 
Therefore, aggressive attacks that are illegal on earth are illegal in outer space. 
Similarly, Article 51 of the U. N. Charter extends the "inherent right of self-
defense" to outer space. Hence, states may legitimately resort to force in outer 
space if such force is used in "self-defense" - a term given broad interpreta-
tion in the past. 
The bilateral SALT talks protect certain American and Soviet reconnais-
sance satellites used to verify the SALT Agreements, but fail to provide 
further limitations on ASATs. 
Thus, there is no current ban on the development and deployment of many 
types of ASATs. These satellites may patrol outer space much as submarines 
and destroyers patrol our oceans. While it is unlikely that ASATs will attack 
foreign satellites in peacetime, their existence may contribute to the destabili-
zation of the current military balance. 229 
In order to prevent the proliferation of ASATs in outer space, further de-
velopments in positive law are necessary. A far reaching bilateral limitation 
agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States should be concluded 
before the possibility of limiting ASATs is extinguished by advances in 
technology. This agreement should be supplemented by a similar multilateral 
agreement binding those nations that are developing military space 
capabilities, e.g., the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic 
of China. Both agreements should provide for manned and unmanned inspec-
tions of space objects for verification. Both agreements should also ban all 
other space weapons systems, e.g., space-to-earth, from outer space. 
Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Gold-
berg, stated that Man's greatest danger in outer space lies not in its cold and 
hostile environment, but in our own human nature with its discords and 
violence. Therefore, as the space age unfolds, Man's first responsibility is to 
prevent the extension of his earthly conflicts into outer space. 230 Whether or 
not Man's first responsibility will be met remains to be seen. 
Dana]. St. James 
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